



Delhi Policy Group

Advancing India's Rise as a Leading Power

INDIA STRATEGIC REVIEW OCTOBER 2025

Author

Deependra Singh Hooda

Volume VI, Issue 10



Delhi Policy Group

Core 5A, 1st Floor, India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road, New Delhi- 110003

www.delhipolicygroup.org



Delhi Policy Group

Advancing India's Rise as a Leading Power

India Strategic Review

Vol. VI, Issue 10

October 2025

ABOUT US

Founded in 1994, the Delhi Policy Group (DPG) is among India's oldest think tanks with its primary focus on strategic and international issues of critical national interest. DPG is a non-partisan institution and is independently funded by a non-profit Trust. Over past decades, DPG has established itself in both domestic and international circles and is widely recognised today among the top security think tanks of India and of Asia's major powers.

Since 2016, in keeping with India's increasing global profile, DPG has expanded its focus areas to include India's regional and global role and its policies in the Indo-Pacific. In a realist environment, DPG remains mindful of the need to align India's ambitions with matching strategies and capabilities, from diplomatic initiatives to security policy and military modernisation.

At a time of disruptive change in the global order, DPG aims to deliver research based, relevant, reliable and realist policy perspectives to an actively engaged public, both at home and abroad. DPG is deeply committed to the growth of India's national power and purpose, the security and prosperity of the people of India and India's contributions to the global public good. We remain firmly anchored within these foundational principles which have defined DPG since its inception.

Author

Lt. Gen. Deependra Singh Hooda (Retd.), PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, VSM & Bar, Distinguished Fellow for Military Strategy, Delhi Policy Group

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Delhi Policy Group as an Institution.

INDIA STRATEGIC REVIEW

The ISR features an assessment of key developments, trends, and policies pertaining to India's immediate and continental neighbourhood, and is authored by Lt. Gen. Deependra Singh Hooda (Retd.), Distinguished Fellow for Military Strategy. The research team includes Shreyas Deshmukh, Research Associate. Your comments and feedback may be addressed to Shreyas Deshmukh at shreyas@dpg.org.in. To subscribe, please [click here](#).

Cover Images:

Dr. S. Jaishankar, India's Minister of External Affairs, held bilateral talks with Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in New Delhi on October 10, 2025. Source: [X/@DrSJaishankar](https://twitter.com/DrSJaishankar)

Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh's Chief Advisor and Chairman of the National Consensus Commission, signed the "July National Charter on October 17, 2025. Source: [X/@ChiefAdviserGoB](https://twitter.com/ChiefAdviserGoB)

Sri Lankan Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya called on Prime Minister Narendra Modi on October 17, 2025, in New Delhi during her three-day official visit to India. Source: [X/@narendramodi](https://twitter.com/narendramodi)

© 2025 by the Delhi Policy Group

Delhi Policy Group

Core 5A, 1st Floor,

India Habitat Centre,

Lodhi Road, New Delhi- 110003.

www.delhipolicygroup.org

India Strategic Review

Vol. VI, Issue 10

October 2025

Contents

AFGHANISTAN	1
<i>Taliban Foreign Minister Visits India</i>	1
<i>Deterioration in Afghanistan-Pakistan Ties</i>	2
PAKISTAN	3
<i>Political Developments</i>	3
<i>Deteriorating Internal Security</i>	4
DEVELOPMENTS ON THE INDIA-CHINA LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL (LAC)	6
<i>Corps Commander Level Meeting</i>	6
BANGLADESH	6
<i>Political Developments</i>	6
SRI LANKA	8
<i>India-Sri Lanka Relations</i>	8
NEPAL	9
<i>Post-Revolution Fragile Stability</i>	9

India Strategic Review

by

Lt. Gen. Deependra Singh Hooda (Retd.)

AFGHANISTAN

Taliban Foreign Minister Visits India

Taliban Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi visited India from October 9 to 15, following a travel waiver granted by the United Nations Security Council. The joint statement issued after Muttaqi's meeting with the Indian Foreign Minister Dr S Jaishankar on October 10 stated that India was committed to providing humanitarian assistance, healthcare cooperation, capacity building, and hydroelectric projects.¹

The joint statement also noted that Dr Jaishankar “expressed his deep appreciation to Afghanistan for its strong condemnation of the terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, India on 22 April 2025 as well as for the sincere condolences and solidarity expressed with the people and Government of India.” This statement drew the ire of Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which summoned Afghanistan’s Ambassador in Islamabad and conveyed that the “reference to Jammu and Kashmir as part of India is in clear violation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and the legal status of Jammu and Kashmir.” It also claimed that the joint statement was “highly insensitive” to the “sacrifices and sentiments” of Jammu and Kashmir.² However, the Taliban delegation stood by the joint statement.

Muttaqi met business and industry leaders at the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, interacted with Afghan refugees, and held two press conferences. Women journalists were barred from the first one, but the sharp criticism that followed led to a backtrack in the second conference.³

India announced that it is upgrading its technical mission in Kabul to a full embassy status to deepen its bilateral engagement with Afghanistan.⁴ The Taliban are expected to send two diplomats to New Delhi in November. Muttaqi reiterated the commitment that the Afghan government will not allow any group or individual to use the territory of Afghanistan against India.

India's outreach to the Taliban is being seen as pragmatic, driven by interests on both sides. India seeks to reinsert itself in Afghanistan so that the country does not fall completely under Pakistani and Chinese influence. Muttaqi's visit coincided with a downturn in Afghan-Pakistan ties, with armed clashes breaking out between Pakistan

and Afghanistan. India views this period as an opportunity to increase its influence in Kabul.

For the Taliban, the visit to Delhi is a part of its attempt to gain diplomatic legitimacy and chip away at its international isolation without any changes in its suppressive domestic policies. It also underscores Kabul's interest in showing that it has options beyond Islamabad. New Delhi serves as both an economic partner and a geopolitical counterweight.

Yet, there are limitations to the partnership that must be recognised. India is uncomfortable with the human rights landscape in Afghanistan, and it is uncertain if New Delhi can exercise any leverage in this regard through greater engagement. Ties between the Taliban and Pakistan are deeply entrenched, and the current downturn in relations may not be a permanent feature. Finally, with the large number of terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, promises that these groups will be reined in remain untested.

Deterioration in Afghanistan-Pakistan Ties

October witnessed the sharpest downturn in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in recent years, resulting in airstrikes and armed clashes. The immediate trigger was a counter terrorism operation in the Orakzai district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on October 8, which left 11 soldiers, including one Lieutenant Colonel and one Major, dead.

On October 9, in what was described by the Taliban government as an "unprecedented, violent, and provocative act", Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Kabul and Patika, apparently targeting Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader Noor Wali Mehsud. While Mehsud survived the attack, two senior members of the TTP were killed.⁵

On October 11 and 12, fighting intensified as Afghan forces attacked Pakistani border outposts in Angoor Adda, Bajaur, Kurram, Dir and Chitral – all in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province – and Bahram Chah in Balochistan. Pakistan conducted drone strikes in Afghanistan's southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. Both sides made exaggerated claims of casualties on the other side, though the Pakistani military admitted to losing 23 soldiers in the attacks.⁶ Pakistan closed the two main border crossings with Afghanistan, at Torkham and Chaman, as well as at least three minor crossings, at Kharlachi, Angoor Adda, and Ghulam Khan.

After a two-day pause, heavy fighting erupted again in the areas of Kurram and Spin Boldak on October 14, and Pakistan conducted airstrikes on Taliban positions and TTP hideouts in Kabul and Kandahar provinces. On October 15, the two countries agreed to implement a 48-hour ceasefire, but hours after the truce expired, Pakistan struck

targets in the Paktika province. The Taliban claimed that the strikes killed 10 civilians, including local cricketers, women, and children.⁷

On October 19, the representatives of the two countries met in Doha for talks mediated by Qatar and Türkiye, and agreed to an immediate ceasefire. A second round of negotiations was held in Istanbul from October 25 to 27. It is reported that the Pakistan delegation stated that there will be "no compromise" on Islamabad's demands related to "cross-border terrorism." It also accused the Afghan delegation of "stubbornness, lack of seriousness and non-cooperative attitude."⁸ Pakistani media reports indicate that the Taliban offered to bring the TTP to the table for direct talks with Pakistani authorities, an offer categorically rejected by Islamabad. The three-day discussions ended in a stalemate with both sides blaming each other for the deadlock.

Although the firing has ceased, border crossings remain closed, and tensions persist. Pakistani Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has warned that if "no agreement takes place", it would mean "open war."⁹ Pakistan is also bringing in the India angle, with Asif claiming that the Taliban government was "sitting in India's lap" and fighting "India's proxy war."¹⁰ He later stated, "The people in Kabul pulling the strings and staging the puppet show are being controlled by Delhi."¹¹

Although both sides appear to wish to de-escalate, the fundamental differences are not easily reconcilable. Pakistan is hurting with continuous TTP attacks, and the Taliban appear unwilling or unable to put a stop to this. In the short term, it leaves Rawalpindi only with a kinetic option to pressurise the Taliban. However, given the governance structure of the Taliban, military attacks are unlikely to force durable policy change on Kabul or sustainably reduce the TTP threat.

PAKISTAN

Political Developments

Strains are visible in the ruling coalition between the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The trigger for the latest rift is a disagreement over flood relief and remarks by Punjab Chief Minister Maryam Nawaz regarding the revival of the Cholistan canals project, which has been a longstanding bone of contention between the Sindh and Punjab governments. Objecting to Maryam's tone, the PPP boycotted the National Assembly and the Senate.¹² Senior PPP figures termed Maryam's comments prejudicial to Sindh's interests and warned they could "just as easily sit on opposition benches."

The incident sparked a war of words between PPP officials and PML-N's Punjab leadership, with Maryam refusing to apologise and vowing to defend Punjab's rights.

Emergency meetings between senior federal leaders from both parties failed to resolve the dispute, and there is no immediate prospect of rapprochement.

In Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), there was a major political realignment as the PPP emerged as the single largest party in the 53-seat Legislative Assembly with 27 members, following the defection of at least 10 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) lawmakers. The PPP and PML-N have formally moved a no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister of PoK, Chaudhry Anwarul Haq, whose ouster appears certain.

There was also a change of leadership in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), with Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur resigning on October 8. The development followed recent turmoil within the PTI after a public spat between Imran Khan's sister, Aleema Khan, and Gandapur, in which both parties traded serious allegations. Gandapur accused Aleema of creating divisions within the party, while she alleged that he had told her brother she was attempting to "hijack" PTI with help from the establishment.¹³

Imran's decision to replace Gandapur was also driven by the deteriorating security situation in KP and the government's inability to manage this crisis. Gandapur has been criticised for his weakness in not forcefully confronting the Pakistan military over issues like forced evictions, targeted operations, and handling of counterterrorism policy.

On October 15, PTI leader Sohail Afridi, from Bara tehsil of Khyber district, took oath as the Chief Minister of KP. In his first meeting as the Chief Minister, Afridi took an assertive stance, vowing to end political arrests and blaming the federal government for its "wrong policies" that he said had led to the resurgence of "terrorism" in the area.¹⁴

Deteriorating Internal Security

The Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS), Islamabad, published its latest report covering terrorist violence in Pakistan from January to September 2025. The report notes that in just three quarters, 2025 has proven nearly as deadly as all of 2024, with 2414 fatalities recorded compared to the 2546 in 2024. This year is on course to surpass last year's toll, and if the current trend continues, 2025 could mark one of the deadliest years in a decade.¹⁵

The trend continues, with no letup in violence. On October 7, an ambush by the TTP on a convoy in Orakzai District, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, killed 11 soldiers, including a Lieutenant Colonel and 19 militants. On October 10, an armed attack on a police training centre in Ratta Kulachi, KP, killed seven police officers and six attackers. On

October 17, a suicide bomber targeted a military outpost in North Waziristan, killing seven soldiers and injuring 13 others. On October 24, a roadside bombing in Hangu District targeted police personnel, killing three officers. On October 26, terrorists attempted incursions from Afghanistan in the Kurram district, leading to clashes that killed five Pakistani soldiers and 25 militants. The Pakistan Army has also claimed to have killed hundreds of terrorists in intelligence-based operations.

The internal security crisis in Pakistan was not restricted to KP and Balochistan. On October 9, the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) launched the "Labbaik Ya Aqsa Million March" from Lahore and Faisalabad toward Islamabad, calling for a rally outside the US Embassy to express solidarity with Palestinians amid the ongoing Gaza situation. Authorities blocked the roads around Islamabad, and clashes occurred as TLP supporters attempted to break through the barricades.

Violence intensified on October 12 and 13, when law enforcement authorities raided the TLP camp at Muridke, while the protestors attempted to continue their march. At least five people, including a police officer, were killed, and dozens were injured. The TLP claimed that 11 of its members had died in the police firing.¹⁶

On October 23, the Pakistan government declared the TLP a proscribed organisation under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1997 for its involvement in terrorism and violence.¹⁷ This marks the second time TLP has been banned. The previous ban, imposed in April 2021, was lifted just six months later, in November 2021, following a deal negotiated by the government with the party. This pattern raises serious questions about the durability and effectiveness of the current ban.

There was some relief for the government in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, where, after a week of violent clashes resulting in multiple fatalities, a settlement was reached between the federal government and protestors. On October 4, the Jammu and Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee, which had spearheaded the protests, signed an agreement in which the government agreed to 25 of the 38 demands raised by them. These include education reforms, healthcare improvements, infrastructure development, economic measures, and governance reforms.¹⁸

While the agreement successfully de-escalated the immediate crisis, its implementation has proven contentious and sparked significant political turmoil within the PoK government, where the ouster of the Prime Minister looks imminent. The protests also highlighted fundamental questions about PoK's political status, democratic representation, and economic rights that remain unresolved despite the October 4 agreement.

DEVELOPMENTS ON THE INDIA-CHINA LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL (LAC)

Corps Commander Level Meeting

The 23rd round of the India-China Corps Commander-level talks was held at the Chushul-Moldo border meeting point on October 25. This was the first meeting of the General Level Mechanism in the Western Sector since the 24th round of Special Representatives Talks held on 19 August 2025. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated that “the two sides noted the progress since the 22nd round of Corps Commander Level Meeting held in October 2024 and shared the view that peace and tranquility has been maintained in the India-China border areas.”¹⁹ The Chinese Defence Ministry stated that the two sides had “active and in-depth communication” on managing the western sector and would continue dialogue through military and diplomatic channels under the guidance of the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries.²⁰

While both sides are prioritising stability at the LAC, no new steps have been announced on a pullback of the estimated 50,000 troops per side deployed in Eastern Ladakh. Both sides maintain a pattern of managed engagement and incremental confidence-building. However, achieving full border normalisation is still some distance away.

BANGLADESH

Political Developments

On October 17, Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh’s Chief Advisor and Chairman of the National Consensus Commission, along with the Commission’s members and leaders of various political parties, signed the “July National Charter.”²¹ The charter was developed by the National Consensus Commission established by Yunus in February 2025, following consultations with 30 political parties, and covers constitutional, electoral, and administrative reforms.

The student-led National Citizen Party (NCP), along with four left-wing parties, declined to attend the ceremony. Nahid Islam, the party’s convener, stated that some political parties are signing the document using national consensus as a means of deceiving the public. NCP is seeking official legal status for the July National Charter.²² The signing ceremony was marred by violent clashes outside Parliament, where police deployed tear gas and stun grenades against protesters demanding greater provisions for those who participated in the 2024 uprising.²³

Sheikh Hasina's Awami League remains barred from elections, while she faces charges of crimes against humanity over the violent crackdown on student protests in mid-2024. In her first interview since she went into exile, Hasina has called the ban on Awami League "unjust" and "self-defeating." She warned that millions of Awami League supporters would boycott the 2026 national elections, raising concerns over the legitimacy of the polls.²⁴

In this political vacuum, the Islamic parties sense an opportunity. Seven religious parties have joined the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and announced a new set of programmes to press home five demands, including the introduction of the proportional representation (PR) system for parliamentary elections. The parties also demanded holding of a referendum in November to provide a legal basis for the July Charter.²⁵ Islami Andolan Bangladesh Ameer Mufti Syed Muhammad Rezaul Karim has stated that the current environment in the country is conducive to bringing Islamic forces to power, and it is crucial to implement the PR system to seize this opportunity.²⁶

NCP leader Nahid Islam said the so-called movement for PR by Jamaat-e-Islami is nothing but a calculated political deception. It has been deliberately designed to derail the Consensus Commission's reform process and divert the national dialogue away from the real question, the restructuring of the state and constitution in light of the people's uprising.²⁷

Although most parties have reached a consensus on the July Charter, it remains viewed as a political ploy because the current government has not taken steps to implement it. As the elections approach in Bangladesh, the political fight is intensifying, and three fronts have emerged: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the student-led NCP, and the Jamaat-e-Islami-led coalition of religious parties, all with distinct ideologies.

As Bangladesh gears up for the polls, the army has come under pressure. On October 8, the International Crimes Tribunal issued arrest warrants against 32 accused, including 15 serving officers, on charges of enforced disappearances, murders, and custodial deaths during the Sheikh Hasina regime. On October 22, the officers were produced before the tribunal and sent to a sub-jail within the cantonment.²⁸

There have been some reports that the arrests have caused anger and division in the army, with senior officers opposing the arrests and civil trials.²⁹ According to Bangladesh expert Subir Bhaumik, Army chief Gen Waker-u-Zaman is caught between a rock and a hard place. Many of his subordinates accuse him of being too soft on Yunus. However, if he responds strongly and is rebuffed by Yunus, he is left

with no option but a military takeover.³⁰ For now, Waker appears to have decided to cooperate with the ICT process.

SRI LANKA

India-Sri Lanka Relations

Dr Harini Amarasuriya, the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, undertook her first official visit to India from October 16 to 18. Her public schedule included meetings with Dr Jaishankar, a call on Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a visit to NITI Aayog, and a homecoming stop at Hindu College, where she studied sociology.³¹

In her meeting with the Indian Prime Minister, the two leaders discussed measures to strengthen cooperation in a number of areas, including education, technology, innovation development cooperation and welfare of our fishermen.³² On the fishermen issue, Dr Amarasuriya said, "That is an ongoing issue and something that needs to be discussed. We need to protect the livelihoods of our fishermen as well, but we understand that that's a sensitive issue and we will continue to talk about it."³³

Discussions between Dr Amarasuriya and Dr Jaishankar focused on further strengthening the partnership between the two countries, with emphasis on economic cooperation, connectivity, digital transformation, and education. Dr Amarasuriya acknowledged India's support to Sri Lanka during challenging times and reaffirmed Sri Lanka's commitment to advancing cooperation with India as a close neighbour and longstanding partner in the region.³⁴

In her address at the NDTV World Summit, Dr Amarasuriya said that she looked forward to the continuation of India-Sri Lanka ties on multiple frontiers, including trade routes, updating the 37-year-old free trade agreement, regional cooperation, energy security, including renewable energy development and strategic security in the Indian Ocean. Sri Lanka seeks to establish a maritime hub for the Indian Ocean region, providing a cost-efficient gateway for global trade.³⁵

Following the 2022 economic crisis in Sri Lanka, India has intensified its efforts to foster long-term financial stability in the neighbouring country, with a focus on energy security, economic institutional integration, and infrastructure development.

NEPAL

Post-Revolution Fragile Stability

Following the Gen Z revolution, which ousted the KP Sharma Oli-led government last month, normalcy is returning to Nepal under the leadership of Prime Minister Sushila Karki. In a video message marking one month of the Gen Z protest, Karki pledged to initiate political and administrative reforms to address issues such as corruption, unemployment, and discrimination, while calling for unity in times of crisis.³⁶

On October 6, Karki convened a high-level security meeting to assess the country's evolving security challenges amid mounting pressure to arrest former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli and Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak over the crackdown on Gen Z protestors. The meeting was attended by Home Minister Om Prakash Aryal, Nepal Army Chief General Ashok Raj Sigdel, the Inspector General of Nepal Police, the Inspector General of the Armed Police Force, and the Chief of the National Investigation Department. According to the media reports, the security chiefs unanimously advised the government to proceed only within legal boundaries, cautioning that premature arrests could destabilise the fragile political and communal environment.³⁷

The government has meanwhile launched an investigation into the assets of three former prime ministers, Sher Bahadur Deuba, KP Sharma Oli, and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, as well as two former ministers, Arzu Rana Deuba and Deepak Khadka, over suspected accumulation of illegal wealth through the abuse of public office. The Nepal Rastra Bank, the Securities Board of Nepal, and the Office of the Company Registrar have been asked to collect and submit details of savings, investments, companies, and business transactions linked to the five leaders and their relatives. Police were also asked to provide forensic reports on burnt currency notes and ashes recovered from the residences of former prime ministers Deuba and Dahal, and former minister Khadka, after protestors set their houses on fire on September 9.³⁸

Nepal's major political parties are yet to reconcile with their loss of power. Oli, the ousted Prime Minister and leader of CPN-UML, publicly rejected the legitimacy of the Karki-led interim government and declared that his party would not participate in the elections under its authority. The Nepali Congress has decided to contest the polls, but reserves the option to reinstate the dissolved lower house if the Karki government is unable to conduct credible elections.³⁹ Meanwhile, the Supreme Court is hearing over a dozen writ petitions challenging the formation of the Sushila Karki government and the subsequent dissolution of the lower house.⁴⁰

The immediate challenge for the interim government is to deliver timely and credible elections while maintaining peace and stability. However, Nepal's future depends on

whether it can achieve political stability, economic revival, and institutional reforms that resonate with its frustrated youth.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "India - Afghanistan Joint Statement (October 10, 2025)." Accessed October 26, 2025. https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/40193/India_Afghanistan_Joint_Statement_October_10_2025.
- ² The Wire. "'Kashmir, India' Reference in India-Afghan Statement Triggers Pakistani Protest." Accessed October 26, 2025. <https://thewire.in/south-asia/kashmir-reference-in-india-afghan-statement-triggers-pakistani-protest-amid-border-violence>.
- ³ FOUNDATION, OBSERVER RESEARCH. "India Warily Welcomes the Taliban." Orfonline.Org. Accessed October 26, 2025. <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-warily-welcomes-the-taliban>.
- ⁴ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "Upgradation of the Technical Mission of India in Kabul to Embassy of India." Accessed October 26, 2025. https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/40223/Upgradation_of_the_Technical_Mission_of_India_in_Kabul_to_Embassy_of_India.
- ⁵ Khattak, Daud. "In 'Dangerous' Escalation, Pakistani Drone Strikes Kill Two Senior Taliban Members In Kabul." News. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 20:03:47Z. <https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-taliban-ttp-afghanistan-strikes-drone/33556513.html>.
- ⁶ Hussain, Yashraj Sharma, Abid. "Pakistani, Afghan Forces Exchange Deadly Border Fire: What's next?" Al Jazeera. Accessed October 27, 2025. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/12/afghanistan-pakistan-border-clashes-what-we-know-so-far>.
- ⁷ RIAZAT BUTT. "Afghanistan and Pakistan Have Agreed to an Immediate Ceasefire, Qatar Says." AP News, October 18, 2025. <https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-pakistan-cricket-border-fighting-232bb8c59918af77a92b6d16e4adb52b>.
- ⁸ Arab News. "No Compromise Possible on 'Cross-Border Terrorism,' Pakistan Tells Afghanistan at Istanbul Talks — Official." October 27, 2025. <https://arab.news/8g49f>.
- ⁹ Arab News. "Pakistan, Afghanistan Talks in Istanbul Enter Second Day as Both Sides Seek de-Escalation." October 26, 2025. <https://arab.news/8wus9>.
- ¹⁰ NDTV. "What Taliban Said About Pakistan's 'Proxy War' Charge Against India." Accessed October 27, 2025. <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/baseless-claims-taliban-defence-minister-mohammad-yaqoob-dismisses-pakistans-proxy-war-charge-against-india-9494967>.
- ¹¹ Desk, HT News. "Pak's Khawaja Asif Warns Afghanistan of '50x Stronger' Response, Repeats Rejected 'Delhi Puppet' Claim." Hindustan Times, October 29, 2025. <https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pakistan-khawaja-asif-warns-afghanistan-of-50x-stronger-response-repeats-rejected-delhi-puppet-claim-101761710268902.html>.
- ¹² Dawn.com. "Why Are PPP and PML-N Currently Feuding?" Dawn, 16:39:52+05:00. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1947414>.
- ¹³ The Tribune. "Pakistan's KP Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur Resigns on Imran Khans Directive, Sohail Afridi Named Successor." Accessed October 28, 2025. <https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/world/pakistans-kp-chief-minister-ali-amin-gandapur-resigns-on-imran-khans-directive-sohail-afridi-named-successor/>.
- ¹⁴ Arab News. "New Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Vows to End Political Arrests, Blames Center for 'Terrorism' Resurgence." October 20, 2025. <https://arab.news/85xyb>.
- ¹⁵ Three Quarters of 2025 Nearly as Violent as Entire 2024 | CRSS. n.d. Accessed October 28, 2025. <https://crss.pk/three-quarters-of-2025-nearly-as-violent-as-entire-2024/>.
- ¹⁶ Desk, India Today News. "Pakistan Bleeds as Islamist Group's March Turns Violent, 11 Dead in Police Firing." India Today, October 11, 2025. <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistan->

[violence-tehreek-i-labbaik-pakistan-protest-march-lahore-islamabad-police-open-fire-2801461-2025-10-11.](#)

¹⁷ "TRT World - Pakistan Outlaws TLP Party for Involvement in 'Terrorism, Violence.'" Accessed October 29, 2025. <https://www.trtworld.com/article/16fa2c949872>.

¹⁸ Desk, India Today World. "Pak Blinks as It Signs Deal with POK Protesters, Calls It Victory of Peace." India Today, October 4, 2025. <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistan-pok-peace-deal-ends-protests-agreement-violence-pressure-2797699-2025-10-04>.

¹⁹ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "23rd Round of India-China Corps Commander Level Meeting (October 25, 2025)." Accessed October 30, 2025. <https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/40239>.

²⁰ Singh, Mayank. "India, China Corps Commanders Meet, Agree to Maintain Peace and Tranquillity along Border." The New Indian Express, October 29, 2025. <https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Oct/29/india-china-corps-commanders-meet-agree-to-maintain-peace-and-tranquillity-along-border>.

²¹ Correspondent, Staff. "24 Parties Take Part in July Charter Signing Ceremony: Who Attended and Who Did Not." Prothomalo, October 18, 2025. <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/politics/dwoeouf5gf>.

²² Correspondent, Staff. "July Charter without Legal Basis Will Be Betrayal of the Nation: Nahid Islam." Prothomalo, October 18, 2025. <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/politics/k120123x32>.

²³ ABC News. "Protesters Clash with Police as Bangladesh MPs Agree to Political Reform Plan." October 17, 2025. <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-10-18/protesters-clash-with-police-in-bangladesh-over-political-reform/105907038>.

²⁴ Deccan Herald. "Sheikh Hasina News: Exiled Leader Plans to Stay in India | Delhi | Awami League Boycott | Bangladesh Elections 2026." Accessed October 30, 2025. <https://www.deccanherald.com/world/living-freely-in-delhi-plan-to-remain-in-india-sheikh-hasina-in-her-first-interview-after-exile-3779976>.

²⁵ Correspondent, Staff. "7 Parties Join Jamaat, Announce New Progs with 5 Demands Including PR in Election." Prothomalo, October 19, 2025. <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/politics/0r8rzzlb4w>.

²⁶ Correspondent, Staff. "PR System Implementation Is a Must to Bring Islamic Forces to Power: Charmonai Pir." Prothomalo, October 10, 2025. <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/politics/a7da5epfet>.

²⁷ Dhaka Tribune. "Nahid: Jamaat's 'PR Movement' Nothing but 'Calculated Political Deception.'" Accessed October 30, 2025. <https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/election/394342/nahid-jamaat%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98pr-movement%E2%80%99-nothing-but>.

²⁸ Correspondent, Staff. "Prosecutor's Remarks on Army Officers' Jobs Misquoted, Chief Prosecutor's Office Claims." Prothomalo, October 28, 2025. <https://en.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/bz4xd8j0r0>.

²⁹ Roy, Ujjal. "Bangladesh Army Chief Cancels Saudi Visit amid Internal Turmoil over Arrest of 14 Officers." The CSR Journal, October 14, 2025. <https://thecsrjournal.in/bangladesh-army-chief-cancels-saudi-visit-internal-turmoil-over-arrest-14-officers/>.

³⁰ Bhaumik, Subir. "Showdown Imminent between Bangladesh's Yunus Regime and Army." October 15, 2025. <https://thefederal.com/category/international/bangladesh-army-general-waker-uz-zaman-muhammad-yunus-sheikh-hasina-211673>.

³¹ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. "Visit of H.E. Dr. Harini Amarasuriya, Prime Minister of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka to India. <https://mea.gov.in/media-advisory.htm?dtl/40210/Visit+of+HE+Dr+Harini+Amarasuriya+Prime+Minister+of+the+Democrati+c+Socialist+Republic+of+Sri+Lanka+to+India+October+1618+2025>=".

- ³² "Prime Minister of Sri Lanka Calls on Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi." Accessed October 30, 2025. <https://www.pib.gov.in/www.pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=2180356>.
- ³³ Madhav, Pramod. "PM Meets Sri Lankan Counterpart, Discusses Fishermen Issue Day after Stalin's Push." India Today, October 17, 2025. <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/pm-modi-meets-sri-lankan-counterpart-harini-amarasuriya-discusses-fishermen-issue-day-after-mk-stalins-push-2804840-2025-10-17>.
- ³⁴ Devika. "Prime Minister Meets Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar in New Delhi." The Official Government News Portal of Sri Lanka, October 16, 2025. <https://news.lk/current-affairs/prime-minister-meets-indian-external-affairs-minister-dr-s-jaishankar-in-new-delhi>.
- ³⁵ NDTV. "India's Neighbourhood First Policy Helping All: Sri Lanka PM At NDTV World Summit." Accessed October 30, 2025. <https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/indias-neighbourhood-first-policy-helping-all-sri-lanka-pm-at-ndtv-world-summit-9474532>.
- ³⁶ Online, T. H. T. "PM Karki Calls for Unity, Vows Reforms to Address Corruption and Inequality." The Himalayan Times, October 10, 2025. <https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/pm-karki-calls-for-unity-vows-reforms-to-address-corruption-and-inequality>.
- ³⁷ "Security Chiefs Advise Caution as Prime Minister Karki Reviews Pressure to Arrest KP Oli and Ramesh Lekhak." Accessed October 31, 2025. <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/10/08/security-chiefs-advise-caution-as-prime-minister-karki-reviews-pressure-to-arrest-kp-oli-and-ramesh-lekhak>.
- ³⁸ "Investigation into Assets of Three Former Prime Ministers and Two Former Ministers Begins." Accessed October 31, 2025. <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/10/17/investigation-into-assets-of-three-former-prime-ministers-and-two-former-ministers-begins>.
- ³⁹ "Congress, UML Leave House Reinstatement Option Open." Accessed October 31, 2025. <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/10/11/congress-uml-leave-house-reinstatement-option-open>.
- ⁴⁰ "Top Court Refuses Interim Order against Karki Government, House Dissolution." Accessed October 31, 2025. <https://kathmandupost.com/national/2025/10/30/top-court-refuses-interim-order-against-karki-government-house-dissolution>.



Delhi Policy Group

Core 5A, 1st Floor,
India Habitat Centre, Lodhi Road
New Delhi - 110003
India

www.delhipolicygroup.org